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I. INTRODUCTION
Just as the first merger wave of the late 1880's in the United States
resulted in the birth of Sherman Act,' the recent global merger wave of the
early 2000's, coupled with the growing liberalization of trade, prompted a
large number of developing and transitional economies to adopt
competition laws.2 Pakistan is one of the few developing countries with a
competition law in place for more than three decades: the Monopolies and
Restrictive Trade Practices Ordinance of 1970 ("MRTPO" or the
"Ordinance"). While the Ordinance contained fairly strong provisions, the
agency entrusted to implement it, the Monopolies Control Authority
("MCA"), was rendered clawless by the social and legal framework, in
addition to its staff's lack of expertise. This deficiency, combined with the
changes in the relevant national and global markets through increased trade
across nations, and the growing presence and power of the multinational
corporations ("MNCs") has created an urgent need to overhaul the
Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (2000)).
2 JOSEPH WILSON, GLOBALIZATION AND THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL MERGER CONTROL LAW
62-64 (2003); see also William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition
Policy Institutions in Transition Economies, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 403 (1997).
3 As stated by Wilson
The growing power of corporations' vis-A-vis countries is arguably skewing the balance
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competition regime in Pakistan. Indeed the government of Pakistan, as this
paper goes to press, is considering repealing the MRTPO and implementing
a new Competition Act in its place.4 Similarly, the MCA will be replaced
by a new National Competition Commission.5
This paper is divided into two parts. Part II of the article canvasses the
history of the MRTPO, describes its various provisions, outlines the
organizational framework of the MCA, and documents its enforcement
record. Part III makes recommendations for ensuring the effectiveness of
the new Competition Authority in implementing the new Competition Act.
II. THE COMPETITION REGIME: AN OVERVIEW
A. History
The 1960's was a decade of rapid economic growth in Pakistan, which
at the same time became concentrated in the hands of twenty family
groups.6 These groups collectively held "two thirds of the industrial assets,
80 percent of banking and 70 percent of insurance in Pakistan."7  This
growing concentration of market-shares in the hands of a few prompted the
government to commission a detailed study into the trade, commerce, and
industry of the country. To this end, in 1963 the government constituted an
Anti-Cartel Laws Study Group,8 which in its report found that certain
monopolies, cartels, and vertically-integrated situations existed in the
country. On the basis of the Anti-Cartel Laws Study Group report, a draft
anti-monopoly and anti-cartel law was published in the Gazette of Pakistan
between public and private needs. Big corporations exert disproportionate clout over national
legislation. For example, Jeffrey Garten believes that Boeing-McDonnell Douglas exerts
formidable control over U.S. trade policy. And companies like Exxon-Mobil Corp. "deal
with oil-producing countries almost as equals, conducting the most powerful private
diplomacy since the British East India Company wielded near-sovereign clout throughout
Asia."
WILSON, supra note 2, at 43 (footnotes omitted).
4 Khaleeq Kiani, National Competition Commission to Replace MCA, THE DAWN, Dec.
3, 2005, available at http://www.dawn.com/2005/l2/03/ebr7.htm.
5Id.
6 UL HAQ, MEHBUB, THE POVERTY CURTAIN: CHOICES FOR THE THIRD WORLD 5-6 (1976).
See also Pakistan: Competition and Price Regulations, EIU VIEWSWIRE, Oct. 18, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 16882705 [hereinafter Pakistan: Competition] ("No major
monopolies remain in Pakistan (apart from public-sector utilities), despite the pre-1970s
dominance of cartels and monopolies controlled by a handful of powerful families.").
7 Id.
8 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GLOBAL FORUM ON
COMPETITION: ROUNDTABLE ON BRINGING COMPETITION INTO REGULATED SECTORS,
CONTRIBUTION FROM PAKISTAN 2, (Feb. 9, 2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/14/44/19936969.pdf [hereinafter CONTRIBUTION FROM PAKISTAN].
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(Extraordinary) on June 28, 1969 for public comment.9 On February 26,
1970, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and
Prevention) Ordinance, 1970 ("MRTPO" or the "Ordinance") was
promulgated. 10 It came into force on August 17, 1971.11 Section 8 of the
MRTPO stipulated the establishment of the Monopoly Control Authority
("MCA") for the implementation of the MRTPO. The MCA was constituted
the same day the MRTPO became effective.
12
B. Objective and Scheme of the MRTPO
The MRTPO was the first piece of legislation relating to competition
law in Pakistan. 13  While it was enacted some three years prior to the
present day Constitution of Pakistan, constitutional ground for such
legislation was laid in Article 38(a), which provides for "preventing the
concentration of wealth and means of production and distribution in the
hands of a few to the detriment of general interest.' 14  The Article
proscribes concentration of power if it deters general interest. Although
general interest is not defined in the Constitution or interpreted by the
courts, it arguably could encompass "consumer welfare"--the very
rationale of competition laws. 5 Consumer welfare, a term coined by Judge
Robert Bork, means things that are good for consumers, such as "low
prices, innovation, and choice among differing products."' 6 It should be
noted, however, that "consumer welfare" under Bork's definition also
9 Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970
(Pakistan) (Published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Feb. 26, 1970) [hereinafter
MRTPO].
10 Id.
11 In re Messrs Jupiters Textile Mills Ltd., Monopoly Control Authority, 1986 CLC 2744
at 2745.
12 CONTRIBUTION FROM PAKISTAN, supra note 8, at 2.
13 See Sanaullah Woolen Mills Ltd. v. Monopoly Control Authority, PLD 1987 Supreme
Court 202, 208.
14 The State shall:
[S]ecure the well-being of the people, irrespective of sex, caste, creed or race, by raising their
standard of living, by preventing the concentration of wealth and means of production and
distribution in the hands of a few to the detriment of general interest and by ensuring
equitable adjustment of rights between employers and employees, and landlords and tenants;
Pak. Const. (1973), art. 38 (a).
15 "Competition" may be read as a shorthand expression, a term of art, designating any
state of affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be increased by moving to an alternative
state of affairs through judicial decree. Conversely, "monopoly" and "restraint of trade"
would be terms of art for situations in which consumer welfare could be so improved, and to
"monopolize" or engage in "unfair competition" would be to use practices inimical to
consumer welfare. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, 61 (1978).
16 Id.
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includes "producer welfare"-that is, the benefit that accrues to suppliers of
goods and services. 17  The MRTPO, however, does not have consumer
welfare as its underlying objective. The circumstances leading to its
legislation prompted the drafters to have diffusion of economic power as
the primary purpose of the Ordinance.
1. Offences Under the MRTPO
Since the objective of the MRTPO is to diffuse economic power, it
therefore defined the offences that thwart that goal. The offences under the
MRTPO are: (i) undue concentration of economic power; (ii) growth of
unreasonable monopoly power; and (iii) unreasonably restrictive trade
practices.18 It also discourages trade practices which prevent, restrain, or
lessen competition. 19
a. Undue Concentration of Economic Power
Undue concentration of economic power is not defined by the
Ordinance. However, Section 4 lists the circumstances under which undue
concentration of economic power exists. 20 First, it provides an assets-based
17 See WILSON, supra note 2, at 18.
18 MRTPO, supra note 9 at pmbl. & § 3.
19 See id. § 2(n); see also Haji Ismail Dossa v. Monopoly Control Authority, PLD 1984
Karachi 315, 323. The objects of the Ordinance were, inter alia:
[T]he prevention of undue concentration of economic power in the hands of individuals and
their families, the sharing of benefits of industrial development by the general public, the
elimination of largely narrow family oriented attitudes of the entrepreneurs and the
subsequent establishment of professional management in control of enterprises then managed
and controlled by big business family groups.
Rafhan Maize Products Company Ltd. v. Monopoly Control Authority, PLD 1986 Lahore
346, 354.
20 The MRTPO states that undue concentration of economic power will be deemed to
exist if:
(a) there is established, run or continued an undertaking the total value of whose assets is not
less than [one hundred and fifty million] or such other amount as the Authority may by rule
prescribe, and which is-
(i) not owned by a public company, or
(ii) is owned by a public company in which any individual holds or controls shares
carrying not less than fifty percent., or such other percentage as the Authority may by
rule prescribe, of the voting power in the undertaking;
(b) there are any dealings between associated undertakings which have or are likely to have
the effect of unfairly benefiting the owners or shareholders of one such undertaking to the
prejudice of the owners or shareholders of any other of its associated undertakings.
MRTPO, supra note 9, § 4. See also Monopoly Control Authority (Value of Assets) Rules,
Northwestern Journal of
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test for any private or public company in which an individual owns more
than a fifty per cent share and the total "value of assets",21 of that company
is not less than one hundred and fifty million Pakistani Rupees (or US $2.5
million).22 The MCA is empowered to modify the total value of assets
threshold from time to time. Second, Section 4 lists the situation in which:
there are any dealings between associated undertakings which have or
are likely to have the effect of unfairly benefiting the owners or
shareholders of one such undertaking to the prejudice of the owners or
shareholders of any other of its associated undertakings.23
Section 2(b) of the MRTPO defines "associated undertakings" as:
any two or more undertakings interconnected with each other in the
following manner, namely: -
(i) if a person who is the owner or a partner, of an undertaking or
who directly or indirectly holds or controls shares carrying not
less than thirty per cent of the voting power in such
undertaking, is also the owner or a partner, of another
undertaking or, directly or indirectly, holds or controls shares
carrying not less than thirty percent of the voting power in that
undertaking; or
(ii) if the undertakings are under common management or common
control or one is the subsidiary of another.24
The second situation listed by Section 4 is reflective of abuse of
position in corporate control rather than undue concentration of economic
power. Section 4(b) protects a specific group of people, whereas the notion
of "undue concentration of economic power" is used to protect the general
public rather than a subset of it. Although misplaced in the scheme, Section
4(b) is useful and may be placed under a proper heading in the new
1991 (Pakistan) (English text published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part II,
April 11, 1991).
21 "'[V]alue of assets', in relation to an undertaking, means the value of assets of the
undertaking at cost less depreciation at the normal rates at which depreciation is calculated
for purpose of assessment of income-tax." MRTPO, supra note 9, § 2(o). See also Sanaullah
Woolen Mills Ltd., PLD 1987 Supreme Court at 204 ("The term 'value of assets' includes
not only fixed assets but also current assets."); id. at 213 ("Assets in their entirety have to be
taken into account, that being the sole criterion for determining economic power of
undertaking.").
22 Calculated using the exchange rate as of Jan. 2006, one U.S. Dollar is equal to sixty
Pak Rupees (US $1 = PRK 60).
23 MRTPO, supra note 9, § 4.
24 Id. § 2(b). Section 2(m) defines "undertaking" as "any concern, institution,
establishment or enterprise engaged in the production, supply or distribution of goods, or in
the provision or control of any service."
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Competition Act.
Where the Authority finds undue concentration of economic power
under Section 4, it may:
(i) require the firns or companies concerned, not being public limited
companies, to be converted, within such time and in such manner as
may be specified in the order, into public limited companies;
(ii) require the controlling shareholders of the public limited companies
concerned to offer such part of the stocks and shares held by them
within such time and in such manner as may be specified in the
order to the general public, including the National Investment Trust
and an investment institution established or controlled by
Government;
(iii) prescribe the circumstances in which and the conditions on which
the associated undertakings concerned may deal with each other.
25
b. Unreasonable Monopoly Power
Section 5 lists the circumstances whose presence would constitute
unreasonable monopoly power.26 In effect, Section 5 is the merger control
25 Id. § 12(a).
26 The MRTPO states:
(1) Unreasonable monopoly power shall be deemed to have been brought about, maintained
and continued if-
(a) there has been created or maintained any such relationship between two or more
undertakings as makes them associated undertakings where they are competitors in the
same market and together produce, supply, distribute or provide not less than
[one-third] of the total goods or services in such market;
(b) there has been any acquisition by one person or undertaking of the stock or assets of
any other person or undertaking, or any merger of undertakings, when the effect of the
acquisition or merger is likely to create monopoly power or to substantially lessen
competition in any market, including any acquisition which creates any such
relationship as is referred to in clause (a);
(c) any loan is granted by a bank or insurance company to any of the associated
undertakings of amounts greater or on terms more favourable than for loans made
available to other undertakings in comparable situations, or any loan is granted by a
bank or insurance company to a person undertaking not associated with it on the
condition or understanding that the borrower or any of its associated undertakings will
make any loan to a person or undertaking associated with the lender.
(2) No such relationship, acquisition, merger or loan as is referred to in subsection (1) shall
be deemed to have the effect of bringing about, maintaining or continuing unreasonable
monopoly power if it is shown-
(a) that it contributes substantially to the efficiency of the production or distribution of
goods or of the provision of services or to the promotion of technical progress or export
of goods;
(b) that such efficiency or promotion could not reasonably have been achieved by
means less restrictive of competition; and
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 26:565 (2006)
law of Pakistan. Section 5(1)(a) proscribes contractual arrangements
between competitors in a relevant market whereby they become "associated
undertakings" and enjoy an aggregate market share of 33.33% in the market
with respect to the production, supply, and distribution of goods and
services. Section 5(1)(a) deals with the market share of associated
undertakings only and does not apply to a single firm having more than
one-third of the market share.
Section 5(l)(b), akin to Section 7 of the Clayton Act of the United
States,28 prohibits the acquisition of stocks and assets of one person or
undertaking by any other person or undertaking when the effect of such
acquisition is "likely to create monopoly power or to substantially lessen
competition., 29 Monopoly power is defined in Section 2(g) as "the ability
of one or more sellers in a market to set non-competitive prices or restrict
output without losing a substantial share of the market or to exclude others
from any part of the market., 30 Substantial lessening of competition is not
defined by the Ordinance, nor has any court in Pakistan interpreted its
meaning thus far. The Ordinance does not require any pre-merger
notification; however, certain undertakings holding twenty per cent or more
market share are required to be compulsorily registered with the Authority
pursuant to Section 16 of the Ordinance.3 ' If such a registered undertaking
becomes a party to a merger transaction, it will need to give prior notice of
a merger proposal to the MCA.3 2  Undertakings not registered with the
Authority may, however, seek advice from the Authority, under Section
1 0(d), as to the consistency of their merger proposal with the provisions of
the Ordinance or any rules made thereunder.
3
Section 5(l)(c) proscribes the grant of a loan by a bank or an insurance
company (collectively referred to as a "financial institution") to any of its
associated undertakings at a below-market rate.34 It also prohibits the grant
of a loan to any undertaking which is not associated with that financial
institution when the loan is conditioned on the undertaking subsequently
extending the loan to the financial institution's associate undertaking. The
(c) that the benefits of such efficiency or promotion clearly outweigh the adverse effect
of the absence or lessening of competition.
Id. § 5.
27 Id. § 5(1)(a).
28 Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 USC § 12 (1982)).
29 MRTPO, supra note 9, § 5(b).
30 Id. § 2(g).
31 Id. § 16.
32 Id. § 10.
33 Id. § 10(4); see also Brooke Bond Pak. Ltd. v. Aslam Bin Ibrahim, 1997 CLC 1873
(Karachi).
14 Id. § 5(1)(c).
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objective of this provision is to prevent "price discrimination" by giving
undue competitive advantage to undertakings associated with a financial
institution over other undertakings, which are not associated with such
institutions.
Section 5(2) provides an efficiencies defense to a merger which would
35otherwise be anti-competitive. In addition, it provides an exception to a
merger that would result in a stronger national firm in the business of
exporting goods. While this provision is intended to make national firms
stronger in international market, such mergers may now be reviewed by
countries where the goods are exported under the "effects test." 36 Finally, it
provides an exception for mergers that result in or lead to technical
progress.
37
In addition to the above exceptions, the merging parties have to prove
that such efficiencies or promotion could not reasonably have been
achieved by less anti-competitive means, and that such efficiencies and
promotion clearly outweigh the adverse effects on competition. 38 If the
Authority believes that unreasonable monopoly power exists, it may:
(i) require the person or undertaking concerned to divest himself of the
ownership of any stock or shares or other beneficial interest in any
undertaking or of any assets within such time and under such
conditions as may be specified in the order;
(ii) require the person concerned to divest himself of any position held
by him as an officer, director or partner in any undertaking with
such time and under such conditions as may be specified in the
order;
(iii) require the person or undertaking concerned to divest himself or
itself of the management or control of any undertaking within such
time and under such conditions as may be specified in the order;
(iv) prohibit the person or undertaking concerned from acquiring the
stock or assets of, or the undertaking from merging with, any other
undertaking;
(v) limit the total loans which may be made by any bank or insurance
company to any single individual or undertaking, or to any
undertaking associated with such bank or insurance company;
(vi) limit the investments of any undertaking engaged in the banking,
investment or insurance business;
(vii)require the person or undertaking concerned to take such actions
specified in the order as may be necessary to restore competitive
prices and eliminate restrictions on output or entry of competitors in
35 MRTPO, supra note 9, § 5(2).
36 WILSON, supra note 2, at 2.
37 MRTPO, supra note 9, § 5.
31 Id. § 5(2)b-c.
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the market.
39
Section 5 has certain pitfalls. It defines monopoly power in terms of
the market share of associated undertakings alone and fails to take account
of market concentration. The calculation of market concentration is an
important index to ascertain whether the merger will be anti-competitive.40
Furthermore, in 1996 the MCA framed the Monopoly Control Authority
(Computation of Market Shares) Rules for determining market share. 41 The
bases provided in the rules are simplistic and fail to give an accurate count
of the market shares. 42 In addition, the Ordinance defines "market '43 in
terms of geographic region only and fails to take into consideration the
"relevant product market" dimension of a market.
c. Unreasonably Restrictive Trade Practices
Section 2(n) of the Ordinance defines "unreasonably restrictive trade
3 Id. § 12(b).
40 In the U.S. and other countries whose competition laws are modeled after the U.S,
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is employed for ascertaining the market concentration,
which gives importance to the market share of each firm in the relevant market. The HHI is
calculated by squaring the market share of all firms in the market and then summing the
squares. See U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines § 1.5 (1997 rev. ed.), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/hmg.pdf.
41 The Monopoly Control Authority (Computation of Market Shares) Rules, 1996
(Pakistan) (English text published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part II, Nov. 26,
1996).
42 The rules state:
For the purposes of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (control and Prevention)
Ordinance, 1970 (V of 1970) the information collected through the following sources shall be
utilized for determining the market share of an undertaking(s) beside the data published in
the Monthly Statistical Bulletin of the Federal Bureau of Statistics of the Federal
Government.
(i) Information supplied by the undertaking(s);
(ii) Information available with the Ministries/Division and other Department of the
Federal Government or the Provincial Government particularly their annual reports,
periodic economic survey, date base for monitoring economics activities (particularly
database of C.B.R. for industrial production and commercial activities/trade flows),
etc., etc.;
(iii) Information published in the periodical and newspapers specializing in surveillance
and monitoring of the economic activities;
(iv) Information supplied or published by the trade associations.
Id. § 3.
43 MRTPO, supra note 9, § 2(f) ("'Market' in relation to any goods or services, means
the geographic region in which competition in the production or sale of such goods or the
provision of such services takes place.").
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practice" as "a trade practice which has or may have the effect of
unreasonably preventing, restraining or otherwise lessening competition in
any manner." 4 4  Section 6 lists trade practices which are considered
unreasonably restrictive.4 5
Section 6(1)(a) prohibits agreements between actual or potential
competitors for price fixing,46 market division 47 limiting output, 48 limiting
44 MRTPO, supra note 9, § 2(n).
45 The MRTPO states:
(1) Unreasonably restrictive trade practices shall be deemed to have been resorted to or
continued if there is any agreement-
(a) between actual or potential competitors for the purpose or having the effect of-
(i) fixing the purchase or selling prices or imposing any other restrictive trading
conditions with regard to the sale or distribution of any goods or the provision of
any services;
(ii) dividing or sharing of markets for any goods or services;
(iii) limiting the quantity or the means of production, distribution or sale with
regard to any goods or the manner or means of providing any services;
(iv) limiting technical development or investment with regard to the production,
distribution or sale of any goods or the provision of services;
(v) excluding by means of boycott any other person or undertaking from the
production, distribution or sale of any goods or the provision of any services;
(b) between a supplier and a dealer of goods fixing minimum resale prices, including-
(i) an agreement with a condition for the sale of goods by a supplier to a dealer
which purports to establish or provide for the minimum prices to be charged on
the resale of the goods in Pakistan; or
(ii) an agreement which requires as a condition of supplying goods to a dealer to
the making of any such agreement;
(c) which subjects the making of any agreement to the acceptance by suppliers or
buyers of additional goods or services which are not by their nature or by the custom of
the trade, related to the subject-matter of such agreement.
(2) No such agreement as is referred to in subsection (1) shall be deemed to constitute an
unreasonably restrictive trade practice if it is shown-
(a) that it contributes; substantially to the efficiency of the production or distribution of
goods or of the provision of services or to the promotion of technical progress or export
of goods;
(b) that such efficiency or promotion could not reasonably have been achieved by
means less restrictive of competition; and
(c) that the benefits from such efficiency or promotion clearly outweigh the adverse
effect of the absence or lessening of competition.
Id. §6.
46 A horizontal price fixing agreement among competitors exits if it is formed to raise,
depress, fix, peg, or stabilize the price of a commodity. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
47 THOMAS V. VAKERICS, ANTITRUST BASICS § 6.02 (1985) ("Agreements between
competitors to divide markets include agreements not to compete with each other in: (i)
certain specified geographic areas or territories; (ii) certain customers or classes of
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technical development or investment, and boycotts.49 Cartels fall within the
ambit of Section 6(l)(a). Section 6(l)(b) prohibits vertical price fixing, that
is, agreements between a supplier and dealer of goods to set minimum
prices at which goods will be resold. Section 6(l)(b) applies only if the
goods are sold in Pakistan.5 ° Section 6(l)(c) prohibits "tying arrangements"
51or tied-selling.
Section 6(2) provides similar exceptions and conditions for allowing
restrictive trade practices as those provided by section 5(2) above. Where
the Authority believes that unreasonably restrictive trade practices are being
carried out, it may:
(i) require the person or undertaking concerned to discontinue or not to
repeat any restrictive trade practice and to terminate or modify any
agreement relating thereto in such manner as may be specified in the
order;
(ii) require the person or undertaking concerned to take such action
specified in the order as may be necessary to restore competition in
the production, distribution or sale of any goods or provision of any
52services.
d. Other Circumstances
Section 7 of the Ordinance empowers the Authority to prescribe
circumstances and conditions, in addition to those listed in Sections 4
through 6, under which "undue concentration of economic power" and/or
"unreasonable monopoly power" shall be deemed to exist, and to list trade
practices which shall be deemed to be "unreasonably restrictive."53 Before
prescribing such circumstances, conditions, and practices by General Order,
the Authority must be satisfied that such prescription is in the public
interest and shall notify all persons and those undertakings likely to be
affected by such General Order, by publishing the draft General Order in
the official Gazette for public comment and consultation.
54
customers; and (iii) the manufacture or sale of certain products or types of products.").
48 An agreement between competitors to limit output or production is considered illegal
because it reduces the supply of a product or service, which then increases its price.
49 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 1:3 (1984) ("Boycotts typically
involve a situation in which competing firms with shared market power exploit this power to
cut off a competitor's access to a critical resource, source of supply, or customer base
necessary to enable the boycotted firm to compete.").
50 MRTPO, supra note 9, § 6(1)(b).
51 HOLMES, supra note 49. ("A tying arrangement is one in which the availability of one
item (the 'tying' item) is conditioned upon purchase of another item (the 'tied' item) from
the seller, or upon agreeing to not purchase the tied item from the seller's competitors.").
52 MRTPO, supra note 9, § 12(c).
53 Id. § 7.
54 Id.
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2. Mandatory Registration of Certain Undertakings, etc.
Section 16 mandates certain agreements, individuals, and undertakings
which are in situations that are likely to represent concentration of market
power to register with the Authority. 5 These situations include: (i) when
an undertaking produces, distributes, sells, or provides not less that one-
55 The MRTPO states:
(1) In order that information relevant to the performance of its functions under this Ordinance
is available to the Authority, the following undertakings, individuals and agreements shall be
registered with the Authority in such manner as may be prescribed by rules, namely:-
(a) An undertaking which, during the next preceding calendar year produced,
distributed, sold or provided not less than one-third of the total production or supply of
any goods or services.
(b) Associated undertakings engaged in the same line of business, which during the
next preceding calendar year produced, distributed, sold or provided not less than
[one-third] of the total production or supply of any goods or services.
(c) An undertaking which during the next preceding calendar year, by itself or together
with its associated undertaking, both produced and distributed by wholesale or by retail
or by both not less than one third of the total production and supply of any goods.
(d) An undertaking which is not owned by a public company and the total' value of the
assets of which is not less than [fifty million] rupees.
(e) An undertaking which, by agreement or otherwise, establishes minimum resale
prices for retailers or wholesalers with regard to goods which it produces or distributes.
(f) An undertaking which, by itself or together with its associated undertaking, is the
sole distributor or supplier for more than one undertaking of any goods or services.
(g) A bank, investment company or insurance company which, in relation to any other
undertaking, is an associated undertaking.
(h) An individual who holds or controls, whether directly or indirectly, shares carrying
not less than fifty per cent. of the voting power in undertakings owned by a public
company the total value of the assets of which is not less than fifty million rupees.
(i) An agreement for any such acquisition or merger as is referred to in clause (b) of
sub-section (1) of section 5.
(j) An agreement of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) of section 6.
(k) An agreement for the distribution or sale of any goods which directly or
indirectly,-
(i) limits the areas in which, or the persons to whom, the product may be re-sold;
(ii) prohibits or restricts the distribution or sale of other goods by the distributor;
(iii) limits the persons through whom the distributor may distribute or sell such
goods.
(1) Any licence of patents or technology which limits the freedom of the licensee to use
such patents or technology in the manufacture of any goods or to sell the goods
produced under such licence at such prices, in such areas, to such persons and for such
uses as the licensee may choose, or which limits the freedom of the licensor to grant
additional licences to such persons and on such terms as he may choose.
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third to the production or supply of a particular good or services; (ii) when
associated undertakings competing in the same market and collectively
providing at least twenty percent of any goods or services in that market;
(iii) when an undertaking solely, or together with its associate undertaking,
produces and distributes, by whole or retail, not less than twenty percent of
the total production and supply of any good within a province; (iv) when a
private undertaking's total value of assets is not less than one hundred and
fifty million rupees; (v) when an individual holds more than a fifty percent
share in a public undertaking whose total value of assets is not less than one
hundred and fifty million rupees; (vi) when an undertaking establishes
minimum retail prices for retailers and wholesalers) 6 Section 16 requires
merger, market division, and exclusive dealing agreements to be registered
with the Authority.57
3. Undertakings Exempt From the Application of the MRTPO
Section 25 exempts certain undertakings and activities from the
application of the MRTPO, such as:
i. an undertaking owned by a federal or provincial government;
ii. an undertaking owned by a corporate body established by
government or whose Chief Executive is appointed by or with the
approval of the federal or provincial government;
iii. anything done by a person or an undertaking in pursuance of any
order by the federal or provincial government;
iv. anything done by a "trade union" or its members for carrying out its
purpose;
58
v. activities of certain industries which are regulated by industry-
specific regulators.59
Most developed competition regimes have provided exemptions from the
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 The Industrial Relations Ordinance defines "trade union" as:
[A]ny combination of workers formed primarily for the purpose of furthering and defending
the interests and rights of workers in any industry or establishment and includes an industry-
wise federation of two or more collective bargaining agent unions and a federation at the
national level of ten or more collective bargaining agent unions.
Industrial Relations Ordinance § 2(xxix) of 2002 (Pak.) (English text published in the
Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part I, Oct. 26, 2002).
59 Examples of industry-specific regulators in Pakistan are: the National Electric Power
Regulatory Authority (NEPRA); Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA); Oil and
Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA); and Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority
(PEMRA).
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competition laws to government bodies, certain industries, and activities.
60
The first three exemptions are arguably akin to the "state action"
exemption to the antitrust laws recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Parker v. Brown.61 While state action exemptions are legitimate and may
be allowed in certain situations, such exemptions should not be available to
government-owned undertakings where they are competing and doing
business in a market with private undertakings.
Exempting trade unions (or labor unions) from the reach of
competition law has precedents in developed competition regimes. The
rationale adduced for such exemptions is that employee collective action
will strike a balance between the bargaining power of the labor vis-a-vis
that of the management of the undertaking.
62
The last exemption avoids any potential conflict between the
provisions of the MRTPO and those of other statutes regulating certain
industries.
C. Organization, Functions, and Powers of the Authority
Section 8 of the MRTPO provides for the constitution of the Monopoly
Control Authority. It provides that the Authority shall be composed of no
less than three members, one of whom shall serve as the Chairman of the
60 "Since 1914, the U.S. Congress' focus has been on writing exceptions to the Sherman
Act's coverage and other American antitrust statutes. This has led to the isolation of several
industries and activities from the reach of U.S. antitrust laws." Lawrence L.C. Lee,
Taiwan's Antitrust Statutes: Proposals for a Regulatory Regime and Comparison of U.S.
and Taiwanese Antitrust Law, 6 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 583, 603 (1996). "For example,
public utilities, broadcasters, common carriers, banking and financial enterprises, as well as
professional baseball organizations, have been held largely exempt from antitrust laws." Id.
at 603, n.136.
61 The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1, 277 (1978). ("Parker v. Brown
involved a challenge to a California program which restricted the marketing of raisins in
order to maintain prices. The Supreme Court upheld the program, holding that the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), was not intended to prohibit state-imposed restraints of
trade.").
62 "Both a statutory and a non-statutory exemption protect labor unions from antitrust
prosecution." Davidson M. Douglas, Labor Unions in the Boardroom: An Antitrust
Dilemma, 92 YALE L.J. 106, 120 (1982).
Believing that employee collective action served a valuable function in equalizing bargaining
power between labor and management, Congress explicitly exempted labor unions from
antitrust prosecution under the Clayton Act in 1914. Section 6 of the Act states that
"[n]othing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor ... organizations, . . . nor shall such organizations, or the members
thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade,
under the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976)."
Id. at 121, n.64.
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Authority.63 The members of the Authority are appointed by the Federal
Government. 64
1. Qualifications of Members
Section 8 does not require any specific expertise or professional
qualifications to become a member of the Authority. It prohibits a person to
be appointed as a member if he has or acquires any financial interest that is
likely to affect adversely his ability to perform his functions as a member.
65
Before assuming office, each member is required to make a vow of secrecy
and fidelity to the Authority.66 Members are appointed for a term of five
years.67 In case a member dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office
before the end of his term, the vacancy shall be filled by appointment of
another member for the remainder of the term of the member vacating the
office. 68
2. Organizational Framework
The MCA is organized into four wings:
a. Research and Investigation Wing
The Research and Investigation wing is responsible for conducting
research on the cases which fall within the purview of the Ordinance. It
also conducts comparative studies of other jurisdictions' competition
regimes and keeps track of developments in multilateral organizations, such
as the World Trade Organization ("WTO") and the International
Competition Network. It also regularly monitors the prices of selected
items in the national markets.69
b. Registration Wing
The Registration Wing registers individuals, undertakings, and
agreements under section 16 of the Ordinance.7 ° It renders opinions to
other wings of the Authority, handles court cases, and prepares reference
for the Law Division of the Federal Government. 7'
63 MRTPO, supra note 9, § 8(1).
64 Id.
65 Id § 8(2).
66 Id § 8(3).
67 Id § 8(4).
68 Id § 8(5).
69 1997 GOV'T OF PAK. MONOPOLY CONTROL AUTHORITY ANN. REP. [hereinafter 1997
ANN. REP.].
70 See supra Section II(B)(l)(b).
71 1997 ANN. REP., supra note 69.
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c. Management Information Wing
The Management Information Wing ("MIS") maintains a database on
undertakings, individuals, and agreements for monitoring and policy
purposes. It collects, compiles, and updates data on various industrial
sectors. In practice, however, data is not obtained on a regular basis; rather,
case-specific information is collected as required.73
d. Administration Wing
The Administration Wing provides administrative support to staff and
officers of the Authority.74 It is also responsible for managing the accounts
of the MCA, preparing annual budgets,7 5 and ensuring disbursement of
funds.
3. Functions of the Authority
Section 10 of the Ordinance lists the following functions of the
Authority:
(a) to register undertakings, individuals and agreements;
(b) to conduct enquiries into the general economic conditions of the
country with particular reference to the concentration of economic
power and the existence or growth of monopoly power and
restrictive trade practices;
(c) to conduct such enquiry into the affairs of any undertaking or
individual as may be necessary for the purposes of [the] Ordinance;
(d) to give advice to persons or undertakings asking for the same as to
whether any actions proposed to be taken by such person or
undertaking are consistent with the provisions of [the] Ordinance, or
any rules or orders made thereunder; [and]
(e) to make recommendations to the Federal Government or a Provincial
Government or to the appropriate authority or officer of such
Government for suitable Governmental actions to prevent or
eliminate undue concentration of economic power, unreasonable
monopoly power or unreasonably restrictive trade practices.
4. Powers of the Authority
The Authority has legislative, quasi-judicial, investigative, and
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Ordinance76 and to appoint such officers and staff as it may deem
necessary.77 It also has the power to summon information from any
undertaking concerning its "organization, business, trade practices,
management and connection with any other undertaking. 78 For any
proceeding or inquiry under the Ordinance, the Authority enjoys those
powers vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
in relation to the following matters:
79
i. for summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witness and
examining him on oath;
ii. for receiving any document or object as evidence;
iii. for requisitioning any public record from any Court or office; and
iv. for issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses and
documents.80
The Authority may also initiate an action on its own or upon reference
from the Federal Government on any matter that falls within the purview of
the Ordinance.81 Where an individual or an undertaking fails to comply
with the order passed by the Authority, or willfully fails to register as
required by the Ordinance, or knowingly furnishes false information or
makes false statements, the Authority may impose a penalty not exceeding
one hundred thousand rupees (US $1667).82 If the offense is a continuing
one, the Authority may also direct the guilty individual or entity to pay ten
thousand rupees (US $167) per day, from the day the offense occurred.
5. Appeal from the Orders of the Authority
Any person against whom an order has been passed by the Authority
may proffer an appeal to the High Court within sixty days of the
communication of such order. The order can only be challenged on the
following grounds:
i. that it is contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law;
ii. that it has failed to determine some material issue of law or usage
having the force of law;
iii. that there has been a substantial error or defect in following the
procedure provided in the MRTPO which may possibly have
76 MRTPO, supra note 9, § 24.
77 Id. § 9.
78 Id. §21.
79 1d. § 15.
80 Id.
S Id. § 14.
82 MRTPO, supra note 9, § 19.
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produced error or defect in the order upon the merits.
83
D. Factors Impeding Implementation of the MRTPO
1. Industrial, Social, and Legal Framework
Soon after the promulgation of the MRTPO, the nationalization
process under the Economic Reform Order of 1972 was initiated, restricting
the scope of the Ordinance. 84 During the early 1970's, thirty-two large
manufacturing units were nationalized, and virtually all heavy industry was
transferred to the public sector. 85 The Board of Industrial Management was
created to oversee the thirty-two nationalized undertakings and ten
corporations. All nationalized undertakinfis were exempt from the
application of the MRTPO under Section 25.8 During this era, the focus of
MCA's enforcement was on diversification of the shared equity of the
undertakings. A large number of private undertakings which did not meet
the "total value of assets" threshold were converted into public companies.
87
In 1976, the Foreign Private Investment (Promotion and Protection)
Act ("FPIA")88 was promulgated to provide for "the promotion and
protection of foreign private investment in Pakistan." 89 The Act granted
protection to foreign investment in "industrial undertakings" in Pakistan
established on or after September 1, 1954.90 While domestic undertakings,
after being nationalized, were exempt from the application of Section 25 of
the MRTOP, foreign undertakings were not touched out of fear of the FPIA.
There were virtually no undertakings that came within the ambit of the
MRTPO.
To further minimize the role and independence of the Authority, in
1981 the MCA, together with the Securities and Exchange Authority, were
placed as departments into a newly formed Corporate Law Authority
("CLA"). 9' The Chairman and Members of the CLA were also nominated
as Chairman and Members of the MCA for performing the functions under
83 Id. § 20.
84 CONTRIBUTION FROM PAKISTAN, supra note 8, at 2.
85 Id.
86 MRTPO, supra note 9, § 25.
87 CUTS CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE, COMPETITION REGIME IN PAKISTAN:
WAITING FOR A SHAKE-UP § 5.1 (2002), available at http://www.cuts-
international.org/Pakistan-report.pdf [hereinafter "WAITING FOR A SHAKE-UP"]; see also
CONTRIBUTION FROM PAKISTAN, supra note 8, at 2.
88 Foreign Private Investment Act (Promotion and Protection), No. XLII of 1976 (1976)
(Pak.).
89 Id. at pmbl.
90 Id. § 1(3).
91 See CONTRIBUTION FROM PAKISTAN, supra note 8, 7.
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the MRTPO.92 The priority of the CLA was the enforcement of corporate
laws; the enforcement of MRTPO was further held back.
93
The industrial and legal framework in the first two decades of the
MRTPO reduced its enforcement to virtually nil. During the nationalization
spree, the government discouraged the MRTPO's enforcement, as it could
dissuade investment. Later the organizational framework under the CLA
put it on the backburner. However, in 1994 the government detached the
MCA from the CLA and restored its autonomous status.94 While the MCA
has investigated hundreds of cases since 1994, and has also been after
cement, sugar, and other cartels, the MCA has hardly been successful in
breaking them.95
2. Substantive Provisions of the MRTPO
As seen from the discussion above, there are a few lacunae in the
substantive provisions of the MRTPO, which, among others, include:
i. the Ordinance does not capture single firm monopoly situations;
ii. the Ordinance specifically excludes from its application government
entities;
iii. the Ordinance does not separate the investigation and prosecution
functions of the Authority from that of adjudication;
iv. the Ordinance does not provide compensatory mechanisms for
consumers or undertakings suffering from anti-competitive practices;
v. the Ordinance seriously limits the ability of the Authority to impose
fines by prescribing a maximum penalty that may be awarded;
vi. the Ordinance does not require pre-merger notification nor provides
any guidance to the merging parties as to when they should seek
clearance from the MCA.
3. Institutional Capacity of the MCA
Historically, the MCA is a defunct organization. 96 One main reason
for the poor performance of the MCA is that the MRTPO does not require
any professional qualifications or expertise for the members of the
Authority. The government viewed the MCA as a parking space for
government officials who the government wanted to get rid of or punish.97
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 WAITING FOR A SHAKE-UP, supra note 87, § 5.1 (2002).
95 See Section I.D.4 below.
96 Naween A. Mangi, Comment: Are Flourishing Cartels Reason Enough to Shut Down
the Impotent MCA?, DAILY TIMES, available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?
page=story_23-12-2004_pg5_10 (Dec. 23, 2004).
97 Id. The author had a telephone interview with Syed Bilal Ahmad, Chairman, MCA on
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Thus, "not only are the most incompetent lot tossed there but the most
disgruntled as well. That translates to little or no incentive to act."
98
In addition to poor leadership, the MCA is heavily understaffed. To
carry out the functions of the Authority the Chairman is supported by two
members. One is responsible for legal and administrative issues, while the
other heads the research and investigation. There are 22 posts, of which
eleven (on the technical side) are lying vacant. The MIS section, which
comes under Member, Legal, and Administration, has four posts. However,
only one programmer has been employed in the section. Similarly, out of
the six posts for the registration wing, four are lying vacant. The posts of
Chief of MIS and of Registrar are vacant. Member Research and
Investigation has no economist to aid his work. 99 The understaffing has
affected the performance of the Authority. As a result, there is no research,
consumer advocacy, monitoring of prices, or initiation of inquiries. 00
4. Enforcement Record
The MCA's enforcement record is dependent on the government
policies and its institutional status. The performance may be divided into
three distinct phases of its life so far:
i. From 1971 to 1980 (the period marked by nationalization and
creation of state monopolies);
ii. From 1981 to 1994 (when MCA was reduced to become a wing of
Corporate Law Authority (CLA));
iii. 1995 to 2005 (MCA divested from CLA and operated as an
autonomous quasi judicial body).' 0 '
January 26, 2005. Mr. Ahmad stated this as one of the reasons for the poor performance of
the MCA.
98 Mangi, supra note 96.
99 Monopoly Control Authority Needs Restructuring, BUSINESS RECORDER, Apr. 2, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 5170989 [hereinafter MCA Needs Restructuring].
100 "Daily Times spent weeks pursuing Dr Safdar Mahmood, the chairman of the MCA in
Islamabad for an interview. All we wanted to know was how many decisions the MCA
made in the last two, three or five years. After several brush-offs, Dr Mahmood's office
finally refused an interview." Mangi, supra note 96.
101 This information is obtained by the author from the Monopoly Control Authority (file
on record with author).
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From 1971 to 1980, MCA dealt with the following cases:
Nature of cases No. of Cases
Conversion of private limited companies into 17
public limited companies
Divesture of excessive shareholdings 4
Registration of prohibited agreements 19
Total order passed 408
From 1980 to 1995 MCA dealt with the following cases:
Nature of cases No. of Cases
Conversion of private limited companies into 7
public limited companies
Divesture of excessive shareholdings 6
Inter-corporate financing 3
Monopoly power I
Registration of prohibited agreements 49
Total order passed 193
From 1995 to 2005 MCA dealt with the following cases:
Nature of cases No. of Cases
Conversion of private limited companies into 2
public limited companies





Registration of prohibited agreements I
False information 3
Non-compliance of Authority's order I
Non-compliance of request for information 202
Total order passed 450
In recent years, the MCA has taken action against undertakings in
various sectors °2 and opened inquires against cartels in the following
102 These sectors include
i. Fertilizer (urea) (Fauji Fertilizer Company Ltd).





iii. Polyester staple fiber;
iv. Sugar;
v. Ghee/cooking oil; and
vi. Cigarettes.
10 3
The cement cartel is one of the starkest examples of cartels that exist in
Pakistan. Below is a brief history of the cartel and the Authority's efforts to
break it.
a. The Cement Cartel: Chronology
The cement industry is one of the most vital and rapidly growing
industries in Pakistan. At the time of her birth, Pakistan had four cement
factories with a total capacity of 0.5 million tons per annum.1 4  Prior to
nationalization of the industry in 1972, there were fourteen production units
both in the public and private sector with a total capacity of 2.5 million tons
per annum. 05  In 1972, the State Cement Corporation of Pakistan was
formed and charged with the responsibility of producing cement in the
country. During the mid-1990's, with the policy of privatization and de-
nationalization, state-owned cement plants were privatized and the private
sector was permitted to invest in the cement industry.
10 6
ii. Tea, toilet soap and ice cream (Lever Brothers Pakistan Ltd).
iii. Soda ash and PTA (ICI Pakistan Ltd).
iv. Polyester staple fibre (Dewan Salman Fibre Ltd & Ibrahim Fibre Ltd).
v. Tractors (AI-Ghazi Tractors Ltd).
vi. Automotive batteries (Exide Batteries Ltd).
vii. Packetted biscuits (English Biscuits Ltd and Continental Biscuits Ltd).
viii. Mineral bottled water (Nestle).
ix. Compressors (Pakistan Electronics Ltd).
x. Cigarettes (Lakson Tobacco Company Ltd).
xi. Septran and Ventoline (Glaxo SmithKline).
xii. Jute (Thai Jute).
MCA Needs Restructuring, supra note 99.
103 Id.
104 Central Board of Revenue, Govt. of Pakistan, CBR Quarterly Review, vol. 3, No. 1,
July-Sep., 2003, at 21 (2003), available at http://www.epb.gov.pk/epb/jsp/SRO/
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In 1998, a cartel was formed in the cement industry.'17 All members
were allowed a certain production limit, and no member could increase
production without the prior permission of the cartel members. 108 The
cartel set the prices and each member shared the profits peacefully. 10 9 As a
result of this price-fixing, the price of cement rose by 100 rupees per bag
and still continues to be higher than the fair market price.110 In the same
year, the MCA took cognizance of the cartel's presence, and tried to bust it,
but was not successful due to lax enforcement of the law, and partly "due to
political pressures.
' II
The cement cartel continued to exist even five years after the MCA's
initial judgment in 1998. In 2003, the MCA started a new inquiry into the
cement cartel,' 12 and finally passed orders in late October and early
November against "18 cement factories for non-compliance of its orders to
reduce the ex-factory cement prices, ''A 13 to bring down prices to the level as
of January-March, 2003.114 Cartel arrangements constitute unreasonably
restrictive trade practices and are prosecuted under Section 6(1)(a). Section
12(c) specifies the types of orders which the Authority can make to remedy
the offenses that fall under section 6.1 5 Section 12(c) does not purport to
give the Authority the power to require the undertakings to restore prices as
of some certain date in the past. The Authority, however, imposed the fine
of 100,000 rupees and 10,000 rupees per day, starting November 15, 2005,
against the eighteen named cartel members. 16
The cartel members subsequently appealed to the Sindh High Court."
17
The cartel members contended that the Authority, while issuing this order,
did not take into account the prices of the raw materials used in
manufacturing of cement, which had increased by fifty percent since early
107 Id. at 28.
108 See Mangi, supra note 96.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 CBR Quarterly Review, supra note 104, at 30; MCA Needs Restructuring, supra note
99; see also M Israr Khan, New Law Under to Check Profiteers, BUSINESS RECORDER, Aug.
8, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 12475618.
112 MCA Begins Probe into Formation of Cement Cartel, THE DAWN, July 16, 2003,
available at http://www.dawn.corn/2003/07/16/ebr4.htm.
113 M. Rafiq Goraya, 18 Cement Units Penalised, BUSINESS RECORDER, Jan. 10, 2006,
available at 2006 WLNR 686850; see Cement Sales Up 12 Percent in Six Months, BusINEss
RECORDER, Jan. 4, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 209141 [hereinafter Cement Sales Up];
see also Pakistan: Competition, supra note 6.
114 SHC Suspends MCA Order to Cut Cement Prices, BuSINESS RECORDER, Jan. 7, 2006,
available at 2006 WLNR 405743 [hereinafter SHC Suspends MCA Order].
115 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
116 See Goraya, supra note 113; Cement Sales Up, supra note 113; Pakistan:
Competition, supra note 6.
117 SHC Suspends MCA Order, supra note 114.
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2003. '18 They further argued that the MCA had no power to fix the prices,
and its actions were therefore ultra vires.119 The Sindh High Court
suspended the order of the Authority on January 6, 2006.120 In the cement
cartel case, the Authority seems to have transcended the powers given to it
by the MRTPO.
b. Other Cartels
In addition to the cement cartel, other cartels, such as those of
automobile manufacturers and sugar producers, enjoy "an absolute freedom
to manipulate their prices to fleece the public through their influence in the
relevant ministries." 1 21 Political pressures and the influence of MNCs,
122
coupled with the lack of legal and technical expertise of the Authority, have
so far provided an environment conducive to the birth and growth of cartels.
5. Concluding Remarks
The industrial, social, and legal framework surrounding the MRTPO,
compounded by its insufficient substantive provisions and the institutional
capacity of the MCA together rendered the competition regime in Pakistan
totally ineffective. Indeed, there have been proposals in place, from as
early as 1993, to strengthen the Pakistani competition regime. The first
proposals to discourage the creation of monopolies and to protect consumer
welfare intended to achieve their objective by making amendments in: (i)
the Companies Ordinance, 1984;1 T (ii) the Securities and Exchange
Ordinance, 1969;124 and (iii) the Modaraba Ordinance, 1980.125 In early
2001, the MCA submitted a draft of the Competition Act meant to
supersede the MRTPO to the government. The draft was based on the
model law offered by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development. However, the draft has not been finalized as of the date this
paper goes to press. The Government has engaged World Bank consultants




121 Kiani, supra note 5.
122 Muhammad Arsahd Perwaiz, Member, Monopoly Control Auth., Prospects for a
Multilateral Framework on Competition Policy and Law § 7(i) (Apr. 29 - May 2, 2003)
(presented at the 8th International Workshop on Competition Policy and Law, co-hosted by
Korea Fair Trade Commission and OECD at Seoul, Korea) (during discussions with the
representative of an MNC, a veiled indication was given that the headquarters may not like
the enforcement of a particular provision of the competition law).
123 Companies Ordinance, 1984, No. XLVII (1984) (Pak.).
124 Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, No. XVII (1969) (Pak.).
125 Modaraba Companies and Modaraba (Floatation and Control) Ordinance, 1980, No.
XXXI (1980) (Pak.); Pakistan: Competition, supra note 6.
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available to the public for comment sometime during the later half of 2006.
III. THE CHALLENGE AHEAD: MAKING A COMPETITION
REGIME EFFECTIVE
A. The Proposed Law
Though the draft competition law has not been made available to the
public, there are reports in the press that give a bird's eye view of the new
Competition Act. It has been reported that the focus of the new Act will be
on promoting competition in the private sector, rather than taking measures
against the undue concentration of economic power.126 The scope of the
law will be broadened. 127 Under the proposed law, the new Competition
Authority would be able to take action against a single-firm monopoly. The
definition of "undertaking" will be broadened to include "association of
undertakings" as well. 128  Comprehensive merger control laws will be
added, and the amount of fines that the new Authority can award will be
raised from the present ceiling of 100,000 rupees and an additional 10,000
rupees per day to a maximum of 2 million rupees and 100,000 rupees per
day.129 To recover the penalties and other dues from the undertakings, the
new Authority will be given power to recover under the Income Tax
Ordinance, 2001 instead of as an arrear of land revenue. 30 The new
Authority will also be given mandatory access to the databases of the
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and the Central Board of
Revenue. 131
The organizational structure of the new Competition Authority will be
different from the MCA. There will be a division of the prosecutorial and
judicial functions of the new Authority. 3 2  The Authority will also be
empowered to engage consultants, experts, and advisers as and when
needed. 33  Under the proposed law, the Ministry of Finance will be
required to establish a consultative process among the existing regulatory
bodies, and the new Competition Authority will ensure that a uniform
126 Sajid Chaudhry, Competition Law in the Making, DAILY TIMEs, Aug. 12, 2005,
available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story- 12-8-2005pg5_j
[hereinafter Competition Law in the Making].
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Pakistan: Competition, supra note 6.
130 An "arrear of land revenue" is a mode of collecting dues from private parties.
Chaudhry, supra note 126; see § 19(3) of the MRTPO, supra note 9 (providing that penalties
imposed under the Act shall be recoverable as arrear of land revenue).
131 Chaudhry, supra note 126; Pakistan: Competition, supra note 6.
132 Competition Law in the Making, supra note 126.
133 id.
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policy will be followed for bringing competition in the market. 3 4 The
performance of each regulatory body will be assessed by giving it a target
for each year and its achievement will be weighed according to
international best practices. 135
From the press reports, it appears that the proposed changes will fill
most of the lacunas previously identified. To add to these changes, it is
suggested that the proposed law should not exempt government entities
from the application of competition law. Furthermore, it should provide a
mechanism of redress for consumers or undertakings suffering from anti-
competitive practices. The new Authority should be assigned the roles of
competition advocacy and consumer protection as well.
B. Determinants of an Effective Competition Authority
It is clear from the discussion above that the primary reason for the
ineffectiveness of the Pakistani competition regime is the lack of
independence and efficiency of the MCA. Apart from improving the
substantive provisions of the Competition Act, an independent and
efficacious competition Authority is a sine qua non for making a
competition regime effective in Pakistan, or for that matter anywhere else.
The next section discusses some of the determinants of an effective
competition authority.
1. Qualified Leadership
The leadership of the Authority is critical to the "effective performance
of its mission." 136 The chairman and members of the Authority should have
substantial experience and expertise in the areas relevant to the Authority's
mission. "Such expertise is essential if the [Authority] is to devise an
enlightened policy agenda, select effective methods for executing the
agenda, and 3ersuade outside constituencies that its choices are worthy of
deference." '  Members with no expertise are "institutional liabilities" and
weaken the Authority's capacity "to formulate sound policies because it
breeds disrespect in the eyes of external observers and weakens acceptance
134 Kiani, supra note 5.
135 id.
136 Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Special Committee
to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission, reprinted in 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 60
(1989). See also id. at 118, n.173 ("It is trite but true that the Commission can be no better
than its leaders."); COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE
GOVERNMENT, COMMITTEE ON INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS, A REPORT WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS viii (Jan. 1949) ("The quality of the members is the most vital single
factor in the successful operation of these commissions.").
137 William E. Kovacic, The Quality of Appointments and the Capability of the Federal
Trade Commission, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 915, 927 (1997).
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for the [Authority's] views."
38
If the government really wants to strengthen the competition regime
and wants the competition law and policy to be enforced, it should appoint
the most qualified people available to the Authority. For the regulatory
bodies, statutes drafted in recent years require certain qualifications for the
members of the authority.1
39
2. Independence
The Authority should be independent of governmental, political, and
external pressures. Qualified appointees and assurance as to their term of
appointment will inevitably ensure the independence of the Authority. The
government should refrain from meddling with the functioning of the
Authority and should discourage the politicians from influencing the
Authority through ministries.
3. Transparency
The Authority should develop standards that explain why it chooses to
prosecute or not prosecute a certain matter. To achieve such a standard, the
Authority should in all cases record rationales for its decision and make
them available to the general public on its website.
4. Maintenance of Databases
In line with the above, the Authority should compile a full statistical
database of its enforcement activities. The database should provide:
i. the number of cases initiated under various provisions of the Act;
ii. provides the subsequent procedural and decisional history of the
case; and
iii. prepare the aggregate statistics for each type of case each year.14
0
The MCA used to provide statistical data of its enforcement activities
whenever it prepared its annual report. However, the new Authority should
maintain this record on a more regular basis. According to one
commentator, "a current and historically complete enforcement data base
would promote better understanding and analysis, inside and outside the
138 Id.
139 For a precedent of qualification requirement in regulatory agencies in Pakistan, see
Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, No. XIII § 6 (2002),
available at http://www.pemra.gov.pk/ordinance.htm.
140 William E. Kovacic, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n., Achieving Better
Practices in the Design of Competition Policy Institutions 3 (Apr. 20, 2004) (remarks before
the Seoul Competition Forum 2004), available at www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/
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agency, of trends in enforcement activity."'
4 1
All developing and transitional economies which are currently
developing competition regimes should give high priority to maintaining
and sharing its enforcement record. Such access would allow the
competition authorities to benchmark their performance with that of other
similarly situated authorities. 1
42
5. Annual Review of Functioning of the Authority
Every year the Authority should conduct a study to review the past
year's enforcement record. The study should not only focus on what the
Authority has achieved over the last year, but should also analyze "selected
elements of its enforcement process and the methodology for
assessment."'143  Commenting on the importance of the review of the
Authority, one scholar noted:
We must regard the analysis of past outcomes and practices as a natural
and necessary element of responsible public administration. Even if
definitive measurements are unattainable, there is considerable room for
progress in determining whether actual experience bears out the
assumptions that guide our acts. 44
The Authority should consider review of its functioning as a vital tool to
improve its efficiency and therefore should allocate funds in its budget for
such studies every year.
6. Human Resources Audit
The effectiveness of the Authority will largely depend on its staff. To
continuously improve its capacity, the Authority should regularly assess its
human resources. 4 5 The Authority should have power to engage experts
and consultants on a contractual basis and the ability to pay them
handsomely. The archaic model of manning the Authority with people
employed by the government will only result in poor performance of the
Authority. Rather than placing government servants at the Authority, the
Authority should hire personnel who have expertise relevant to the
Authority's mission and enforcement agenda.
141 Id. at 3-4. For a formative treatment of the value of good statistical records and for an
analysis of competition policy, see Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust
Enforcement, 13 JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS 365 (1970).
142 Kovacic, supra note 2, at 3-4.
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7. Comparative Study
In its efforts to continuously improve its performance, the Authority
should not shy away from learning from the experiences of other
jurisdictions. "It is malpractice for any jurisdiction to consider adjustments
in its own institutions without examining experiences abroad. 14 6 For a
nascent competition Authority, it has much to improve, be it merger
analysis, investigation techniques, substantive standards, competition
advocacy, or personnel policy. Both foreign developed and developing
jurisdictions have much to "teach any competition authority, 147 and the
Authority should benefit from those experiences.
8. Competition Advocacy
The advocacy role of a competition authority has two prongs. First,
for effective enforcement of competition law, the competition authority
should create awareness of the law in the general public and engage in
advocacy from the consumer protection perspective. Second, the Authority
should actively participate in the "formulation of [the] country's economic
policies, which may adversely affect competitive market structure, business
conduct and economic performance."' 14 Although Pakistan has had a
competition regime in place for more than three decades, the law was rarely
enforced. The market players are not aware of competition principles, nor
has "competition culture" taken root. To this end, the Competition
Authority should undertake an active advocacy role for effective
implementation of the law.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is time for the MRTPO to be replaced with a new Competition Act
and for the MCA to be replaced with an efficacious and independent
Competition Authority. However, it would be a mistake to assume that once
a new law is drafted and a new Competition Authority is established, the
task of reforming the law will be complete. The development of a
competition regime is a "work in progress.' 49 The new Competition
Authority, as the agent for implementing the law, will play a vital role in
establishing the regime. To carry out its responsibilities effectively, the
146 Id. at 6.
147 Id.; see, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Lessons of Competition Policy Reform in Transition
Economies for U.S. Antitrust Policy, 74 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW 361,363-64 (2000).
148 GOV'T. OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL COMMITTEE ON COMPETITION POLICY
AND LAW § 6.4.7, quoted in COMPETITION COMM'N OF INDIA, CONCEPT NOTE ON ADVOCACY
ACTIVITIES OF CCI 2 (2003), available at http://www.competition-commission-
india.nic.in/advocacy/Concept.note-onAdvocacy.Activities of._CCI.pdf.
149 Kovacic, supra note 2, at 1.
594
At The Crossroads: Making Competition Law Effective In Pakistan
26:565 (2006)
focus of the Authority should be to achieve "better" practices. °5 0 To that
end, the Authority should regularly pose these questions to itself: "Do we
have the right statutes? Have we created the best means for
implementation? Do our policies achieve good results?"'15 1 The answer to
these questions would require the Authority to periodically undertake a
comprehensive review of its functioning. In its earliest stages of
development, it is suggested that the new Competition Authority should
review its functioning at short intervals. Through the mechanism suggested
above, it is hoped that the new competition regime in Pakistan will be more
efficient and effective.
150 "To speak of 'best' practices may suggest the existence of fixed objectives that, once
attained, mark the end of the task. It might be more accurate and informative to say we are
seeking 'better' practices." Id. at 1.
151 Id. at 2.
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